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Introduction
"Africa, like some great giant, awaking out of centuries of 
slumber, stretches its limbs, stands up and looks at the dawn. It 
is the dawn of its own day it is looking at . . . A frica is on the 
march. Can we not help it gird on its coat for the journey - it is 
a coat of many colours - the coat of African law". These eloquent 
and imaginative words are Lord Denning's. * They were written 
in a spirit of sympathy and confidence; and rightly so. But it is 
well to remember that legal clothes cannot be bought off the peg - 
they must be made to measure - and giants, moreover, are not 
easy to fit. Perhaps it is these among other factors which make 
contemporary Africa one of the most interesting and challenging 
parts of the modern world, particularly to those who would fashion 
constitutions.
It would of course be a mistake to exaggerate either the 
novelty or the uniqueness of many of A frica 's problems. In the 
organization and art of government especially, and in the taming 
of power, all the great issues that have exercised men from the 
time of Plato and Aristotle are once again involved; and plainly 
there is much which the experience of the older countries has to 
offer. But when this has been said, it remains true that old prob­
lems have taken on a new urgency and demand a fresh approach in 
new contexts.
* The speaker has indicated that he may not, during his address, 
strictly adhere to his written text.
1. Foreword to "The Future of Law in A frica", being the 
Proceedings of a Conference on African Law held in 
London, December 1959 - January I960, ed. Allott.
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2If it be the case that law is, in large measure, a framework 
within which a community’ s social, political and economic life has 
its being, it is only within comparatively recent years that inmany 
parts of A frica the problem of adjusting and adapting the framework 
itself has become urgent - due, in part, to the dramatic development 
since World War EL of modern urban and industrial life, and their 
impact on tribal mores. And what is perhaps more important, it is 
only since the advent of their independence that the new nations them­
selves have, in modern times, had the full responsibility and oppor­
tunity to use law and legal institutions consciously as instruments in 
nation-building. The growth of African nationalism and the upsurge 
of independence throughout the continent have, indeed, given a 
powerful new fillip to endeavour; and in law, no less than other fields, 
mark the beginning of a new epoch.
This is not to lose sight of the positive achievements of the past. 
But much of what was achieved in African law and government during 
the 19th century and the first half of the present century, was accom­
plished within a colonial context, and within the limits set by colonial 
policy. The possibilities and perspectives are today vastly different; 
a great opportunity is now at hand for lawyers and others - and I 
speak primarily of lawyers - to do a major job of social engineering, 
such as Roscoe Pound advocated in the United States fifty years ago.
Again, few would nowadays make the mistake of assuming that 
African legal development began in the colonial era: long before 
European colonization, Africans had made their own contribution to 
law and its administration, and now they are free to do so again.
But on this occasion the challenge is greater than ever before. For 
the first time African states are taking their place as adultmembers 
of an international society; and within their own borders, they are 
having to grapple with the formidable task of welding together what 
was good in the colonial heritage, and indeed what they may find to 
be good anywhere, with what they deem worthy of preservation in 
their own indigenous institutions - so as to make a stable, healthy 
and viable whole. Never before have lawyers in A frica been more 
fully alive to the fact that constitution-making is part of a wider 
social process; an operation designed - sometimes cynically - to 
provide means and institutions for implementing policies and 
balancing interests.
And so, it is perhaps worth while, as new vistas begin to open 
up, to take stock of the position and give some attention to current 
trends. Obviously these trends involve all the social sciences;but 
in this paper I shall confine myself to the field with which I am most
3familiar - the field of constitutional law and government. It is a 
significant area of study, affording, as it does, a fair index of a 
nation's social and moral health; and, in contemporary Africa, it 
is seldom if ever dull.
If, going beyond the strictly constitutional field, I give 
emphasis to the international legal aspects of developments in 
Africa, it is because I believe that, in the modern world, consti­
tutions cannot be regarded as purely domestic documents; they 
bear intimately on international claims and responsibilities.
Indeed it is the inte rnationalimplications of nation-building and 
the international aspects of constitution-making which are, perhaps, 
the most interesting; it is here that many time-honoured concepts 
like 'Msovereignty", "state, "  "nation", "federation", "union" are 
being reassessed and reshaped*
Cultural and Legal Pluralism and the Growth.of 
Ascending Unities
Basic to an understanding of contemporary A frica is the 
phenomenon of cultural and legal pluralism. By this I mean the 
present fact (whatever the future may hold) that in most parts of 
Africa peoples belonging to different ethnic, cultural and religious 
groups live within one and the same political unit under different 
systems of law.
To begin with, inm ost African states several different 
varieties of "customary", or indigenous, law operate side by side. 
Matrilineal systems, for example, differ significantly from 
patrilineal ones; and within each of these systems, in turn, there 
are tribal and regional variations. Then, too, account must be 
taken of the fundamental role that has been played in the past in 
various parts of Africa, and which is still being played, by par­
ticular Western legal systems, such as the English common law, 
French law, Roman-Dutch law, and the laws of Belgium, Portugal 
and Spain. An added complication - or, as I prefer to say, source 
of enrichment - arises in those areas where Islamic and Hindu 
groups are strong and where account must be taken of their laws. 
And finally, among the various states themselves, there are 
differences in the patterns and conditions of cultural and legal 
pluralism, and in prevailing policy.
It is not my purpose in this paper to examine the phenomenon 
of cultural and legal pluralism in detail, nor, though I shall be
4concerned with a few of them, is this the occasion for a compre­
hensive discussion of the many problems to which the phenomenon 
itself gives rise.  ^ It is relevant here to note broad trends rather 
than detail.
There can, it would seem, be little doubt that much of Africa 's 
diversity w ill be preserved - consciously and, one hopes, wisely - 
for a substantial period. But the preservation of diversity is not 
incompatible with harmonization of differences where this is needed 
to ensure the achievement of common needs and purposes by common 
endeavour. Europe, for example, w ill surely retain its cultural 
diversity despite the harmonizing of important branches of law which 
the Treaty of Rome requires for the effective working of the 
European Economic Community. Again, the preservation of diversity 
does not preclude the fusion of elements derived from different legal 
and cultural traditions, in order to make a more workaUe and 
satisfactory product. Thus the gradual blending through the cen­
turies of Germanic and Roman elements in the legal systems of 
Europe has not induced a drab cultural uniformity, though it has 
improved the quality of European law.
In achieving a balance between these three things: the preser­
vation of diversity, the harmonization of differences in the interest 
of joint endeavour, and a measure of fusion to improve and enrich, 
lies the hope for what Mr.Albert Lutuli has called the gradual 
achievement of ascending unities among peoples generally - and 
notably among the peoples of Africa. "Somewhere ahead", he 
writes, "there beckons a civilization, a culture, which will take its 
place in the parade of God's history beside other great syntheses - 
Chinese, Egyptian, Jewish, European. It w ill not necessarily be 
all black, but it w ill be A frican ."  ^ Whatever the prospects for 
this prediction may be in Southern Africa in the immediate future, 
it is undoubtedly the current trend in vast areas of the continent.
2. See, generally, my paper on African Legal Studies, to be 
published in the forthcoming issue of Law and Contemporary 
Legal Problems.
3. Let My People Go, American ed. p. 231.
5In their more imaginative and leisured moments lawyers in 
Europe and the United States sometimes look forward to the fusion 
of at least two of the world's great streams of legal thought - the 
Anglo-American and the Romanistic. They recall how Roman law, 
after the fall of the Empire, received progressive infusions of 
Germanic law, and vice versa; they note that a system like the 
Roman-Dutch la w be came richer and more flexible because of its 
"hybridization” , and they advocate an extension of the process.
I like to think that this may be more than an idle dream, and 
that one of the chief areas of fusion, extending beyond the welding 
of Romanistic and Anglo-American elements, will be contemporary 
Africa. ^ The strength of the English common law and of the 
English legal tradition is, of course, manifest in Central Africa, 
East A frica and West Africa. At the same time, the whole of 
Southern Africa, a major part of the Central African Federation, 
the Congo and the Portuguese territories, vast areas of West Africa, 
parts of North Africa, Ethiopia and Somalia - all have powerful 
infusions of Romanistic law. And what is more to the point, there 
are important areas in which English and Romanistic legal ideas 
have already achieved a mutual modus vivendi. For example, in 
South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia English ideas and an un­
codified Romanistic system have long coexisted, and have tended 
both to fuse and complement each other. The need for a mutual 
accommodation of Romanistic and English elements is a major issue 
in the Cameroons today; and interesting developments in other parts 
of Africa may, of course, be expected i f  Pan-African aspirations 
are fulfilled.
Again, as between Western legal systems (both English and 
Romanistic), on the one hand, and indigenous customary law, on 
the other, the processes of "reception", "infiltration", and 
"hybridization" have long been at work in many parts of the con­
tinent, especially in the urban areas - where a kind of modern 
jus gentium appears to be developing.
If these processes are to be encouraged, if  the goal of 
ascending unity is to be achieved, it is necessary to avoid certain 
errors and to cultivate certain virtues in the process of nation- 
building, and in the closely related task of constitution-making.
4. If Britain joins the Common Market, Europe w ill again 
become a focus of interest in this regard.
6Among the errors to avoid, there are two in particular which I 
would like to deal with in this section of my paper, deferring dis­
cussion of the more positive aspects to the section immediately 
following.
In the first place, in several African states today there is a 
discernible tendency to hasten the development of a single national 
legal system, and to play down the role of laws which are personal 
to religious, tribal and ethnic groups. Various reasons may be 
given for this trend; but perhaps the most obvious ones are that a 
uniform national legal system may aid the development of national 
unity and sentiment, and, if conceived on modern lines, may at the 
same time, contribute towards the ''modernization" of a country 
previously regarded as "backward". It was partly for these reasons 
that in Turkey in 1926 Kemal Ataturk sought to eliminate pluralism 
inter alia by the radical substitution of a modern law of Swiss 
origin for the then prevailing multiplicity of personal religious 
laws in the Ottoman Em pire.5
There are, however, obvious dangers in attempting to force 
the pace along the lines favoured by Kemal Ataturk. Thus, to give 
one example, some branches of law are more deeply and emotional­
ly involved with the life and culture of a people than others; and 
hence more resistant to sudden and radical change by legislative 
fiat. This is the case, for example, with family law and the law of 
succession as distinct from, say, the law relating to such inter­
national and impersonal transactions as negotiable instruments.
And for this reason family law may well lend itself more easily, 
and ultimately more effectively, to adaptation and development by 
the gradual process of judicial interpretation and the influence of 
public opinion, rather than by radical legislative reform . Indeed,
5. Compare the conclusions reached by the London Conference on 
The Future of Law in Africa, December, 1959 - January, I960; 
Butterworths, I960. And see Bryce "Roman Law and English 
Law", in Studies in History and jurisprudence, vol. 1, pp. 98, 
124 sqq.
For an account of the nature and effect of the Turkish experi­
ment, see, generally, The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey, 
the proceedings of the Istanbul Conference, 1955, reported in 
Annales de la Faculte de Droit d1 Istanbul, 1956.
7by provoking resentment, the steam-roller approach may, in the 
long run, prove divisive rather than unifying.
Secondly, it is essential to avoid parochialism in outlook. 
There has, for example, been a regrettable but very widespread 
tendency among English-speaking lawyers, and in English-speaking 
law schools, to concentrate on English and to a lesser extent, 
American constitutional ideas, virtually to the exclusion of continental 
ideas, in the study and exposition of constitutional and administrative 
law. In part this tendency is attributable to the fact that, where it 
occurs, the English constitutional system is the law of the land - at 
any rate in outward form. In part, too, it has derived in some 
quarters from a peculiar notion that Continental or Bomanistically 
based constitutional regimes are adverse to freedom. "It cannot 
be denied", writes Sir Henry Slesser, "that absolutism in govern­
ment has often gone hand-in-hand with the reception of civil law, 
for civil law is of dictatorial origin. " 6
Neither of these considerations, however, affords any suffi­
cient justification for parochialism; and Sir Henry Slesser's views, 
in particular, are, with respect, exaggerated.  ^ Bomanistic 
systems are not necessarily enmeshed in doctrines like quod 
principi placuit vigorem legis habet - as anybody familiar with the 
history of Scotland and Holland well knows. Happily there are 
already indications of a change of attitude, especially in African
6. The Law, 1936, pp. 10-11. To the same effect, a statement 
by Mr. Justice O.W.Holmes, quoted by 0 JSullivan, The King*s 
Good Servant, 1948, p. 19.
7* For what is submitted to be a better assessment, see F*H« 
Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law, 1953, 
p. 211. And see, generally, D.V.Cowen, The Foundations of 
Freedom, pp. 208-9, 223.
Sir Henry Slesser has adhered to his views consistently for 
many years. See, for example, the recent exchange of 
correspondence between him and Mr. E .N . van Kleffens of 
the European Coal and Steel Community in the columns of 
The Times, May 24th, 1962.
8legal circles. In this regard the appointment of a Swiss constitu­
tional lawyer to advise the KADU delegation at the recent Kenya 
Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House (February, 1962), 
is not without significance; and the appointment of Professor 
Weston, a lawyer with both a Bomanistic and an English common 
law background, to be Dean of the Law School recently established 
in Dar-es-Salaam, is very encouraging.
It is well that this widening of horizons should come about; 
for Continental public law is, in fact, a store-house of principle 
of considerable significance for contemporary Africa. Consider, 
for example, practices like the modern Continental alternatives 
to judicial review by the ordinary Courts, which have already 
made an impact in what was formerly British Cameroons; or the 
German idea that, in the interests of freedom, legislation should 
apply generally 8 - especially legislative exceptions to constitu­
tional guarantees - and that the need for protection should be 
focussed rather more on administrative action; or, again, the 
requirement that constitutionally guaranteed human rights, though 
not absolute and subject to qualification, may not be infringed 
"in their essence";’  or the provisions in the West German Basic 
Law which are designed to offset potential instability in Cabinet 
government of a Parliamentary kind. 10 Not only are these idpas 
interesting in themselves, but, as we «hall see more fully 
presently, they may well play an increasingly important role in 
contemporary Africa - not only, what is more, in areas where 
Continental influence has in the past been strong. In short, if, 
as I believe, there is always a strong case for dealing with prob­
lems of constitutional and administrative law comparatively, it is 
especially strong in contemporary Africa, which seems healthily 
determined to remain flexible in the pursuit of precedent and 
example.
8. Art 19(1) of the Basic Law of the West German Federal 
Bepublic.
9. Art 19(2) of the Basic Law of the West German Federal 
Bepublic.
10. A rt 67 of the Basic Law of the West German Federal 
Bepublic.
9A word, now, on the relevance of the indigenous govern­
mental traditions of Africa. Anyone concerned with constitutional 
law in Africa does well to remember that among many African 
peoples, the idea of con3titutionalism is no novelty, and that 
indigenous institutions have much to teach concerning, the methods 
of taming power. * No one would seriously suggest that the old 
ways of disciplining tyrannous chiefs, or the old procedures for 
obtaining a full and free consensus of opinion on matters of public 
concern, are wholly applicable in a modern state; but modern techi- 
niques are often only means of achieving ancient and familiar 
objectives, and it helps greatly to give them vitality and accepta­
bility if it can be shown that, despite their possibly unfamiliar 
garb, they are really old friends.
South African and Rhodesian universities are, of course, 
particularly well placed to Study and aid the growth of a system 
which aims not only at accommodating indigenous African and 
Islamic elements, but which may also incorporate what is best in 
the Romanistic and Anglo-American traditions. For the time being 
this role may, however, be played more actively in centres of 
learning beyond the borders of South Africa; but one day, when 
present racial preoccupations and digressions have passed away, 
Southern Africa will, I hope, contribute in full and great measure 
to a rich and distinctively African legal development.
New Patterns of Closer Political Association
One of the outstanding facts of contemporary Africa is the 
great interest which is being shown.by the newly independent 
states, and by those on the eve of independence, in forms of 
closer association. As is well known, this interest stems from 
many causes, among them being (i) a desire to avoid the impotence 
of "balkanization” , and to secure the advantages in economic 
prosperity, m ilitary strength and international influence which, 
it is felt, may result from association on a large scale; (ii) a 
desire, to remedy the effects of the artificial boundaries established
H« The point has been emphasized by almost every informed 
writer on African institutions. See, for example, Maclean's 
Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs, 1S58, pp. 24 sqq; 
J. M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution/ 1906; and among 
more recent writings, I. Schapera, Government and Politics 
in Tribal Societies, 1956, pp. 135 sqq; and M. Fortes and
E.E.Evans -Pritchard, African Political Systems, 1940.
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during the scramble for Africa, by superimposing more inclusive 
and appropriate boundaries; and, perhaps, (iii) the sense of 
brotherhood involved in Pan-Africanism.
A ll this is perfectly natural and understandable; and, from 
one point of view, it would seem to suggest little that is either 
novel or of compelling interest; for history affords many other 
examples of movements towards closer association for basically 
similar reasons. But when one looks deeper, the contemporary 
African scene deserves the closest attention, because many of 
the African states are professedly seeking to evolve patterns of 
association which do not easily fit into the conventional categories 
of "federation", "confederation","political union", "customs 
union" and so on.
With these considerations in mind the Centre for Legal 
Research (New Nations) in the University of Chicago organized 
a Symposium on Federalism in the New Nations, earlier this year, 
to discuss the relationship between the achievement of the parti­
cular objectives which peoples may have in desiring closer 
association, and the form of political or constitutional structure 
best suited to achieve these objectives.
The Conference was attended by persons from many parts 
of Africa as well as by economists, constitutional lawyers, 
sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists from the 
United Kingdom, Continental Europe, India, Australia, Canada 
and the United States.
During the course of a week’ s conference, we discussed 
many topics; and it is not my purpose here to attempt a summary 
of the papers which were presented, the discussion which took 
place, or the conclusions which were reached. ^  There are, 
however, a few topics of direct relevance, which were dealt with, 
and which I would like to develop somewhat.
(a) Clear-minded Assessment of Means and Ends
One of the advantages of an internationally composed con­
ference on law and government, especially if it is inter­
disciplinary, is that it may help to disabuse people's minds of a
12. I am at present editing the proceedings for publication, it is 
hoped, early next year.
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certain amount of nonsense and delusion, and open the way for the 
clearer perception of real issues. In this regard the Chicago 
Conference was rewarding. Those, for example, who tended to 
think about movements towards closer association in terms of 
clear-cut categories, neatly labelled "political union"., "federated 
state", "a  confederation of states", "customs union", "common 
market", "common services organization", and so on, were soon 
disabused; they came to see that this was both unfruitful and divorced 
from current reality. Rather than devote time to conceptualism, 
and problems of definition, it is preferable to regard movements 
towards the closer association of peoples and groups as taking place 
upon a wide spectrum of development, in which peoples who think 
of themselves as members of more limited communities gradually 
broaden their awareness of interests, concerns and needs which 
they have in common, and which can only be satisfied by common 
endeavour.^
Those who on the basis of some of the experience of some of 
the older federations, feared that classical federation leads pro­
gressively to overbearing and irresistible power at the centre, 
found reason to modify this view.
Those who had become disenchanted with the whole idea of 
federalism because of the "bad odour" which it has acquired in 
Central Africa and Indonesia, came to realize that good institutions 
maybe used for bad ends. They saw the Central African experiment 
as an abuse of federal machinery - a means whereby an entrenched 
minority controlling a powerful centre dominates an overall 
majority. Eut it did not follow that the institution of federalism 
should be jettisoned because of previous misuse. It could be 
remedied. "Give me three black Prime M inisters,"  said one 
delegate, "and of course I would be in favour of a (re-drafted) 
Central African Federation. M
Those who saw in federalism the only way of effectively 
entrenching a B ill of Rights came to see that this was not the case.
13. Points emphasized at the Chicago Conference with great force, 
especially by Gabriel d'Arboussier, the Minister of Justice, 
Senegal, Professor Robert Bowie of Harvard University and 
by Dr. Oscar Schacter of the General Legal Division of the 
United Nations Secretariat.
12
Tn this regard the recent Constitution of Jamaica is instructive.
There -were those, too, -who emphasized - and rightly 
emphasized - the danger of big states, and wished to retain a 
maYimnm of autonomy in small communities - who felt, with de 
Jouvenel, that :
“ The big state is a bad thing in itself. It 
becomes all the more blind to individual realities 
as its size increases. It becomes more inhuman, 
more geometric, more automatic. It cannot 
recognize individuals and their size, but only their 
classified files. If in a small state there may be 
injustice through favour Consisting of unequal 
treatment of equal cases, the big state presents 
another form of injustice - injustice through 
classification, and consisting in treating unequal 
cases in a uniform way. The Greeks believed 
that the dignity of the individual only finds assurance 
in a small state where each may make himself 
heard and where each is taken into consideration.
'The empire, ' said the Greeks, 'is the work of 
barbarians, as the city is the work of civilized 
men. * "
It was salutary for such persons to be reminded by Professor 
Paul Freund, of Harvard, that though size had its dangers it also 
had its advantages. He reminded the Symposium that James 
Madison in a brilliant essay, No. 10 of the Federalist series, had 
shown that size had within it the seeds of its own salvation; for the 
very multiplicity of interests potentially present in a large associa­
tion requires (as, indeed, the history of the United States has 
proved), shifting coalitions on various issues - and this tends to 
operate as a barrier against the tyranny of a firm  majority. ^
14
14. Constitutional amendments require a measure of support from 
the opposition.
15. "Extend the sphere . . .  take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens. "  Federalist, 10, p. 47 (Max Eeloff's edition).
13
Again, those who saw federalism as the only means of 
preserving cultural diversity were corrected by the examples of 
the United Kingdom and Holland - ^mitary systems enjoying very 
considerable cultural diversity.
But, for present purposes, perhaps the main point emphasized 
by both lawyers and political scientists at the Chicago Conference 
is the importance of recognizing that constitution-making is a func­
tional operation in which it is necessary first to identify the actual 
human interests, and clarify the human objectives involved. Only 
when this has been done can one realistically begin the more 
technical though very sophisticated task of devising means and 
instrumentalities for the accommodation of interests and the achieve­
ment of objectives.
Moreover, if this task of adjusting institutions for the achieve­
ment of objectives is to be successfully accomplished, there would 
seem to be certain minimum requirements. In the first place it is 
necessary to uncover or disclose real objectives as distinct from 
bogus ones (which are often camouflaged in fine phrases). Then it 
is necessary to place objectives in some order of priority; for often 
choices have to be made between having one’ s cake and eating it.
And thirdly - to revert to a point which I mentioned earlier - it must 
be kept in mind that the search is always for the appropriate pattern 
of government, not the conventional stereotype nor the precise label; 
for there are many possibilities of closer association at various 
points in a wide spectrum.
Let me now try to give these points concrete illustration in a 
few specific cases which are of immediate practical significance in 
contemporary Africa.
(b) Federation and Economic Benefit
Critics of political federation in Central Africa, when they give 
their attention to economics, tend either to cry down the economic 
advantages of closer association among states; or alternatively, 
while conceding that in certain circumstances economic advantages 
do result from a customs union and. on a more comprehensive scale,
16. A point stressed by Professor Morton Grodzins of the 
University of Chicago.
17. Especially by Professor Rustow of Columbia University 
and the Brookings Institution.
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from a common market, question whether it is necessary, in 
order to gain these advantages, to establish a supra-national 
political entity, a new political state with law-making and tax- 
raising powers. They ask, as Advocate H. W.Chitepo asked in 
a notable paper presented to the Chicago Conference, whether it 
would not suffice to set up a mere treaty relationship between 
the associating states, along the Imes, perhaps of the East African 
Common Services Organization.
Possibly these views as to the economic advantages which 
may be achieved in Central Africa without political federation 
are coloured by an antipathy (which is, 1 think, understandable 
enough) to the very notion of federation. For, in this regard, it 
is interesting to observe that the same doubts about the need for 
political association in order to secure economic benefit were 
voiced in East A frica during the years before World War II, when 
it was feared that East African federation would be merely an 
expedient for white minority control over the African majority. 
But now that these fears have been removed - there is no longer 
any possibility of white domination in East Africa - we find 
leading politicians, like Dr. J. G.Kiano of the Kenya African 
National Union, taking pains to show why the full advantages of 
a common market cannot be secured in East Africa without a 
substantial measure of political federation; without, in short, 
establishing an adequately powered central government.
18. For the nature of these advantages, see the short and lucid 
account in The Report of the Economic and F iscal Commission 
(East A frica) - the Raisman Report, Cmnd. 1279 of 1961, 
paras 45 sqq; and compare the rather more perfunctory 
paragraphs in the Monckton Report, Cmnd. 1148 of I960, 
paras 50 et. sqq.
19. Adv. H, W. Chitepo, formerly of the Southern Rhodesian Bar 
and a leading member of ZAPU, is now Director of Public 
Prosecutions in Tanganyika.
20. This was, indeed, the main burden of his paper on The 
Emergent East African Federation, presented to the 
Chicago Conference.
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That Dr.Kiano is correct in his conclusion may, I think, 
be demonstrated by the lessons of history, by the provisions of 
the Rome Treaty setting up the European Common Market, and 
by certain considerations of a more theoretical nature*
Neither the Zollverein (1836-71), which preceded closer 
political association in Germany, nor the pre-Union Customs 
and Railways agreements negotiated in South Africa, nor the 
Articles of Confederation which preceded the establishment of 
the American federation in 1789, afford any evidence that 
economic benefit among states can be promoted and peacefully 
shared without a substantial measure of political integration.
Indeed the evidence is the other way, and in all three cases the 
economic imbalance which resulted from political impotence 
ropeatedly threatened to break out into armed hostility.
Again the framers of the Treaty of Rome gave a great deal 
of thought to the relationship between a customs union (or external 
tariff barrier) and the maintenance of an internal free market in 
goods, services, capital arid labout (a common market); and 
especially to the conditions necessary for obtaining the benefits 
of such institutions. They reached the conclusion that customs 
unions and common markets were, in fact, interrelated; and 
what is perhaps more pertinent for present purposes, they were 
satisfied that the advantages of a common market could not be 
achieved without harmonization or approximation of laws among 
the Six in regard to such matters as anti-trust (anti-monopoly) 
legislation, dumping, state aid, tax benefits, and social security 
laws. 21
In regard to the more general theoretical considerations 
involved, I do not propose here to canvass the field. It must 
suffice to say that the case for a substantial measure of political 
organization in order to secure economic benefit in trans­
national association has been argued with great cogency by Lord 
Robbins, and more recently, with special reference to economic 
growth and industrialization, by Professor Soia Mentschikoff• 2^
21. For specific provisions see Article 85 et sqq. of the Treaty.
22. "Economic Aspects of Federation", in Federal Union, a 
Symposium edited by M. Chaning-Pearce, London, 1940, 
pp. 167 sqq.
23. In the course of a powerful paper presented to the Chicago 
Symposium. See also Federalism and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Countries, ed.Ursula Hicks,London, 1961.
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The nub of the matter is that if states would enjoy the 
economic advantages of a common market, they have to pay a 
political price - a price involving a surrender of national 
sovereignty in the economic field. ^  Thus, to give one illus­
tration, the Dutch Constitution was specifically amended to enable 
the Netherlands to participate effectively in the European Common 
Market; the amended constitution expressly provides for the 
supremacy of international treaties over national legislation or, 
indeed, over the national constitution itself. ^5
2 6This is not an easy price for new nations to pay. But it 
is noteworthy that the constitutions of Ghana and of several West 
African states in the French-speaking area do, in fact, specifically 
provide for a surrender of sovereignty in the interests of internatioal 
cooperation. This, on the face of it, augurs well; but only the 
future can establish whether constitutional professions of this kind 
will be matched by actuality,
(c) Federalism and International Legal Relations
In the course of his paper on "The Emergent East African 
Federation'*, ^  Dr. J. G. Kiano said that :
"The realities of the situation call for a novel 
type of federation - that provides the central govern­
ment with a very wide range of powers in administrative, 
economic and social-service matters, while specifically 
leaving the fields of foreign relations, international 
defense, and cultural development to the separate states."
24. See, in particular, Gerhard Bebr, "The Relation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community Law to the Law of the 
Member States" in vol. 58, Columbia Law Review, 1958, 
pp. 767 sqq.
25. See also Art. 24(1) of the West German Basic Law and 
Art. 11 of the Constitution of Italy.
26. Compare the reluctance of the states of the Netherlands to 
give up any of their newly won sovereignty after the struggle 
against Phillip II.
27. Above, p. 14, note 20.
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The reason for such a proposal was stated by Dr.Kiano in 
the following terms:
"A fter all, A frica wants to play a decisive role 
in international politics. To do this, African countries 
can ill afford to reduce their voting strength in inter­
national matters. *'
In terms of conceptual categories, the problem posed by Dr. 
Kiano may be stated as follows : can one combine the advantages 
of a "federation" for internal or domestic purposes with those of 
a 11 confederation for international purposes ? Or, as I prefer to 
formulate the issue, more functionally, what are likely to be the 
effects of making the attempt (a) on the proposed federation, and 
(b) on international legal relations.
Dr.Kiano and others see, as a precedent for the kind of 
accommodation which they envisage, the relationship between the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the constituent Republics 
of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. But are they right?
It must be emphasized that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages in attempting to follow the Russian precedent; and 
the disadvantages probably outweigh the advantages. To begin with, 
looking at the matter from the purely internal or domestic point of 
view of the associating states, one must offset against the formal 
retention of "sovereignty1*, (a) the additional cost of diplomatic 
representation; (b) the risk of jeopardizing the political stability 
of the federal government - especially where centrifugal forces 
are strong; and (c) the risk of a weakened impact in international 
relations, which might result from presenting a divided front to 
the outside world. For these, among other reasons, it is 
generally considered to be wise to make international relations 
the overriding concern of the central government. ^
It is true that the expedient which we are now discussing 
works in the case of Russia; and in fact Russia derives considerable
28. One of the main themes of a paper written by Professor Kenneth 
Dam for the Chicago Symposium on Federalism.
29. See also Lord Robbins1 essay, note 22 above.
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diplomatic advantage in the United Nations and elsewhere by reason 
of the separate inte mational identity of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. 
But it is at least doubtful whether the reasons which induced world 
powers to recognise the separate identity of Byelorussia and the 
Ukraine could easily be duplicated; for Russia succeeded in pressing 
her claims by hard bargaining and with great resources during a 
critical formative period in the life of the United Nations. Whether 
African states could exert similar pressure on the United Nations 
today, without disrupting the organization, is another matter.
Again, while it is true that the Constitution of the U S.S.R. makes 
provision for formal autonomy and independent statehood among 
the component republics - designed, inter alia, to open the way 
for multiple voting in international organizations - it is probable 
that this kind of de jure or formal independence can only be success­
fully manipulated where, de facto, there exists rigorously co­
ordinated political control.
This is not to say that the member states of an associating 
group, which have technically abandoned sovereignty in a federal 
structure, should be denied all participation in international 
organisations. If they do not pitch their claims too high; if, for 
example, they were to confine their claims to membership of the 
associated agencies of the United Nations (UNESCO, W.H. O.,
W, M. O ., etc. ), there would be both sound precedent and sound 
reason in their favour. There are, however, limits to what can 
be done without seriously blighting the tender but incalculably 
valuable plant which we call international law.
The moral of all this is, perhaps, the need for scrupulous 
candour in formulating and stating objectives, and a sober weighing 
of what is involved to achieve them. Without this, constitution- 
making may degenerate into a cynical process of make-believe and 
double -talk.
(d) Federalism, Ethnic Groups, and Human Rights
Turning now to the protection of individual human rights and 
of group rights, here again there is need for scrupulous candour 
and clarity.
30. Aspaturian, op. cit.
31. A  point which has been developed by Professor Dam, 
note 28 above.
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To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between 
individual and group rights* One may achieve an effective protection 
for the position of a group qua group, yet within the group itself the 
individual may not be protected* French Canadians ip. Quebec have 
thought much about group rights but they have not hitherto been 
conspicuous in the assertion of individual rights* ^
Secondly, i f  it is feared that a small group may be "swamped” , 
as a group, by a larger or economically more powerful group - which 
is, for example, the KADU fear in Kenya today, or the fear which the 
Malays have for the Chinese in Malaya - it by no means follows that 
classical federation is the answer. In fact, where the members of 
ethnic or religious groups desire special protection, but where they 
are dispersed horizontally throughout the community, then it would 
seem that federalism as such has no role to play in their protection. 
This is a point that has been well expressed by M r.F .G .C arnell of 
the University of Oxford. Dealing specifically with Central A frica 
and Malaya, he says:
"It would be generally conceded that federalism 
is an attempted solution to territoria l rather than racial 
conflicts of interest. It endeavours to square unity with 
diversity, but it can only do so on the supposition that 
the major diversities are territoria lly expressed. If 
the major diversities have no inclusive territorial base 
but traverse the whole society in the form of racial or 
communal conflict between intermingled communities, 
it is extremely doubtful i f  federalism can serve any useful 
purpose. . . There are undoubtedly almost insuperable 
difficulties over working an orthodox federal system in 
plural society federations like Central A frica or Malaya". ^
In these circumstances, then, assuming it is considered 
desirable to give protection to groups as such, there are other more 
appropriate constitutional techniques which may be used for this
32. A point stressed by both Professor Stanley de Smith, of the 
London School of Economics, in the course of an admirable 
paper presented to the Chicago Conference, and by Dean Frank 
Scott, Q.C., of the Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal.
33* Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries , 
ed. Hicks, pp. 22-3.
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purpose, such as "protective discrimination!' clauses, along the 
lines of those in the Indian and Malayan Constitutions - clauses 
which guarantee a quota of jobs, and so on. Again one may resort 
to specially composed second chambers in a bicameral system - a 
topic to which I shall revert presently.
Thirdly, it should be remembered that the entrenchment of 
group rights may not only conflict with certain individual rights (as 
is the case, for example, where land rights, or jobs, or a quota of 
jobs, are reserved for a group), but it may also tend to harden 
divisions which one would hope to eradicate in the course of time. 
Though, as a matter of expediency, deviations from principle may 
sometimes have to be made in the interests of nation-building, they 
should only be accepted after the most careful weighing.
Fourthly, it is sometimes argued that individual rights them­
selves can only be effectively entrenched within a federal structure. 
This is plainly not the case. There are, in fact, several ways in 
which Bills of human rights may be effectively entrenched within a 
unitary constitution, and even within a plural society. One way is 
to entrench the constitution as a whole, to establish a second 
chamber representative of the various groups in the state, ^  and to 
require a measure of consent from all groups when amending the 
constitution. This, incidentally, is an expedient which is being 
canvassed in several parts of the world beyond the borders of South 
Africa - for example, by KADXJ in Kenya. ^6
Having called attention, however, to the limitations of the 
federal "solution" in a racially plural society, where the various 
groups are widely dispersed and inter-mingled, I would like to 
guard against the suggestion that such a situation excludes the 
usefulness of federation for purposes other than group protection.
34. On the importance of giving rigidity t o the constitution as a 
whole, as distinct from the fatally defective formula of 
"partial rigidity", introduced by the framers of the original 
South Africa Act, see my Foundations of Freedom, pp. 133-5.
35. Either by proportional representation, or in one of several 
other ways.
36. And compare the new Constitution of Jamaica.
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On the contrary, the very size of a large country, and its geo­
graphical formation, may well justify the use of the federal principle. 
And where this is the case, other substantial benefits may also be 
gained.
Indeed, federation has considerable value in iteelf; for it 
disperses power, induces the habit of negotiation and compromise; 
and by allaying fears, allows groups to grow into the gradual aware­
ness that they may have common interests, needs and concerns, 
which can only be satisfied by cooperative action.
The Future of the Westminster Model in Africa
Earlier I said that legal clothes must be made to measure.
This is especially true of constitutions. That the Westminster 
model of government is not easily transplantable abroad - that it is 
not always suitable tropical dress - is indeed a truism, and evidence 
accumulates daily to illustrate the point. Ghana's Independence 
Constitution was fashioned on the Westminster model; yet within a 
very short space of time it was radically changed - the B ill of Rights 
provisions, and the patterns of both legislative and executive govern­
ment have all been given an entirely new look. Tanganyika is soon 
to have a president who, it seems, w ill be much more than a figure­
head; and Nigeria is following suit. The "party-system", as it has 
developed in Great Britain, and upon which so much of British con­
stitutional practice is based, is likely - for some considerable time 
at least - to develop along very different lines in many parts of 
Africa. ^
The general lines of these developments are, however, 
reasonably familiar, and probably do not need elaboration here. 
Certainly broad "brush-work" embodied in phrases like "the drift 
to autocracy", and similar stuff, do not seem to me to get one very 
far; nor is it very illuminating. Rather than this sort of thing,
I have thought it might serve a useful purpose if  I deal in concrete 
terms with a few specific examples of constitutional practice in
37. See, generally, a perceptive article by Chief H. 0 .Davies, Q.C., 
of Nigeria in the January, 1962, issue of Foreign Affairs.
38. See the letter of the High Commissioner for the Federation of 
Nigeria, The Times, 1st May, 1962.
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African states which are likely to deviate materially from the 
Westminster model. I shall have to be selective rather than 
comprehensive, partly because I do not know enough to be com­
prehensive, and partly to avoid an already long paper dragging 
on to inexcusable length*
(a) The Need for Executive Stability
Executive power is perhaps the main aspect of government 
which will react distinctively to the plural nature of African 
societies, and the widespread absence of anything like the British 
party-system. Increasingly, as it seems to me, claims will be 
heard among the discerning for executive government to be organi­
zed along, say, Swiss lines in preference to the Westminster model. 
Thus, to begin with, Swiss practice accords representation to the 
various cantons on a seven member executive - which could be a 
useful precedent in African territories where ethnic and regional 
loyalties are too strong to overlook.
Again, while the Swiss executive (the Federal Council) is 
democratically the servant of the legislature (the Federal Assembly), 
stability is ensured by the fact that the Federal Assembly elects the 
Council for 4 years - and neither the constitution nor convention 
requires the resignation of the Federal Councillors, should their 
policy conflict with the Assembly's.
It was not surprising, therefore, at the Conference on Kenya's 
constitutional future, which was held in February, 1962, at Lancaster 
House, to find the KADU delegation favouring an executive structure 
modelled on Swiss lines. A less radical innovation, which would 
allow the continuation in substance of the British model, and yet 
provide a degree of stability and continuity of executive policy, 
would be the West German provision under which the government 
cannot be unseated on a mere vote of no 
alternative government must be proposei
(b) An Increasing Use of Strong Second Chambers
If it be the case that the need to accommodate pluralism and 
to provide stability are likely to result in material modifications 
of the Cabinet system in many African Territories,- it should be
confidence - in addition an
39. Art. 67 of the Constitution.
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added that there is another material factor which points in the same 
direction. And that is the increasingly important role which may be 
played by strong, specially composed, second chambers in several 
parts of A frica. For obvious reasons the existence of a strongly 
powered second chamber, especially i f  popularly elected* has a close 
bearing on the subject of cabinet responsibility.
Nor can there be much doubt that the case for second chambers 
will continue to bepressed; for not only may such bodies act as 
powerful bastions of a constitution itself, btit in plural societies they 
ensure that significant minorities ate not overlooked.
Moreover, in societies in which a traditional chieftainship is 
an important factor, a second chamber may perform a most useful 
function in associating the more traditional elements with new 
centres of power. In Basutoland, for example, though in 1957-8 
a single chamber comprising Chiefs, ex officio, as well as popularly 
elected members, was favoured, I have come to doubt the wisdom of 
that decision (and let it be added, several others) though I was party 
to the constitutional drafting - and accept my share of responsibility 
for it. A House of Chiefs, along Nigerian lines, might have been a 
wiser choice; nor, in view of the moderate powers enjoyed by 
second chambers in Nigeria, would such a choice jeopardise the 
growth of a Cabinet system, should it be decided that a Cabinet 
system may flourish in Basutoland.
This is not the occasion to elaborate upon how the position in 
Basutoland could be improved and developed, beyond, perhaps, 
saying this; it was fully anticipated that the 1958 constitution would 
be merely a first tentative step out of the doldrums towards greater 
responsibility; and certainly the experience of the last four years 
should make the road to greater self-government much easier.
(c) Heads of State
I come now to the last of the subjects with which I propose to 
deal. Between the more formal type of head of state, like the 
President of India - who has substantially the powers and functions 
of the British monarch - and a president like General De Gaulle or 
Dr. Nkrumah, there is very wide scope for differentiation in function
40. See more particularly, the Basutoland Constitutional Report, 
1958, paragraph 84.
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and power. I have no intention here of reviewing the field. There 
are, however, two aspects of the subject which may be appropriate 
for discussion on an occasion sufch as this; and 1 raise them 
summarily with the specific purpose of provoking discussion.
In the firs t place it would seem that in those areas of Africa 
where a traditional chieftainship has lost the balance of power to 
what have been called "the new men” , and where the Head of State 
may well be a "new man” , enjoying wide popular support, the 
office is likely to be far more than an ornamental one - less like 
the presidency of India, for example, and more like the presidency 
of the United States. At the same time the scope for experiment 
is vast - and most fortunately so.
Secondly, in those areas where a hereditary chieftainship, 
and especially a hereditary Paramountcy, is still a powerful factor 
in politics - alongside a growing democratic movement - the 
pattern may have to be somewhat different. If, as I believe, there 
is a very strong case for making traditional rulers in territories 
like Uganda, Basutoland and Swaziland Heads of State, the course of 
wisdom may be to structure their powers nearer to the model of a 
"constitutional ru ler” . Though here, again, I must guard against 
any suggestion (mischievous or innocent) that this means reducing 
a traditional ruler to the status of a mere rubber stamp. Not only 
does such a suggestion grossly misconceive the status of a 
"constitutional ru ler” , but, what is more, there is scope for 
considerable variation in patterns of power and function. The search, 
let me repeat, is always for the appropriate institution of govern­
ment, not the stereotype.
It is, for example, tempting to see a possible source of 
guidance for Uganda (no more than a source of guidance - and not to 
be slavishly copied in detail) in the Malayan arrangement whereby 
the rulers quinquennially elect from among their number a head of 
state (the Yang di Pertuan Agong). However, this would involve 
recognition on the part of the Kabaka of Buganda that he should, from 
time to time, be no more than first among his peers - the Omugabe 
of Ankole, the Omukamas of Bunyoro and Toro, and, perhaps, the 
Kyabazinga of Busogo.
But it is time to draw these speculations to a close. Might it 
perhaps be that the aphorism ex Africa semper aliquid novi may 
come to be as appropriate in the field of constitutional theory and 
practice as it was to the natural historians of the ancient world.
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